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A framework for understanding contemporary changes in the nature
of work is provided by the fordist/post-fordist model which
argues that fordism can no longer sustain high rates of
.productivity under changing conditions of accumulation and is
rapidly giving way to new methods of production, patterns of
consumption and relations of global domination- This framework
forms part of the Regulation approach which focuses on the social
structures, institutions and relations which regulate and resolve
the system of accumulation's contradictions, making it workable
and enabling accumulation to proceed (Gelb 1991).
The Regulation school has developed this argument most
successfully in its analysis of the Fordist regime of
accumulation (or intensive accumulation)• Its starting point is
the labour process, defined as ' fordist' because of Henry Ford's
pioneering role in developing a system of mass produced
standardised goods by highly repetitive mechanical methods. The
result was a labour process that was highly productive and
provided the foundation for a norm of mass consurrt;r"
represented ideologically as the ^American Dream'. It was
associated with a particular system of industrial relations
characterised by collective bargaining and bureaucratic unionism
which promoted relative industrial peace. It also provided the
material basis for the United States' economic and political
international domination, captured in the notion of *Pax
Americana' (Bowles, Gordon and Weisskopf 1984) \
The concept of fordism has been useful in identifying linkages
between the labour process and other areas of economic, social
and political life: for example the match between mass production
and mass consumption, its association with a particular kind of
industrial relations based on an historical compromise between
capital and labour in the US, and the rise of the interventionist
state. Fordism, as an ideal type, has considerable explanatory
value in identifying and linking many significant characteristics
of the post-war boom period in the industrialised economies.
However, this framework has also obscured much of the complexity
within national economies and important differences between them.
Theorists in this tradition have tended to take the labour
process as given and uncontradictory and focused almost
exclusively on the associated institutions, especially features
of the macro-economic system. This paper attempts to rediscover
the labour process in giving content to the concept of fordism
when applied to South African manufacturing.
The fordist labour process is traditionally defined in terms of
the characteristics of the continuous assembly line, the
integration of the production process, the technical direction
of work, the standardisation of production and process as well
as the introduction of advanced machine tools and the associated
deskilling of an homogenous workforce of semi-skilled operators.
This labour process is unproblematically incorporated into
Regulation analysis as the ^prevailing labour process' (De Vroey
: 48) . Its unevenness, its overlap with other methods of
organising work and the modifications introduced by an active and
resistant workforce are not taken into account. Similarly
theorists who have adopted the Regulation approach in explaining
economic crisis in the South African economy have neglected to
investigate the precise nature of the labour process and its
- restructuring.
A detailed empirical investigation of the labour process is
necessary to establish the conceptual integrity of the concept
of fordism, as well as its less-developed sibling, post-fordism.
In the literature, post-fordism is defined purely in contrast to
fordism and has little independent conceptual coherence. There
is little 'explanatory core to the post-fordist case other than
the decomposition of fordist structures'. (Hirst and Zeitlin,
1991: 6)
This paper seeks to empirically investigate the precise nature
of the labour process in the South African metal industry. It
will be argued firstly, that the literature which posits a sudden
rupture between fordism and post-fordism cannot account
adequately for the restructuring of work in this industry whose
labour process demonstrates many important continuities. It will
also be argued that the notion of fordism (and ^racial fordism')
has been unproblematically applied to South African manufacturing
and does not adequately grasp the nature of its labour process,
skewed as it has been by racial patterns of consumption.
This paper makes a case for the inclusion of a more detailed and
systematic investigation of the labour process in developing a
broader understanding of the mode of regulation.
(i) Fordism and Post-Fordism
Within the tradition of industrial sociology a comprehensive
literature has developed around the fordist labour process,
primarily in response to Harry Braverman's classic work, Labor
and Monopoly Capital (1974).
The fordist assembly line brought the technical direction of work
to its fullest potential. The process of assembly was broken
anto its constituent parts and each team of workers added only
a limited number of parts to the work in progress before it was
passed on to the next team. This new method of organising work
was entrenched by the technology: the assembly line provided
unambiguous direction to work. Henry Ford emphasised the
^delivery of work' to each worker instead of * leaving it to the
workmen's initiative to find it' (Edwards 1979: 118).
The assembly line also established a uniform pace of work and
dictated the work rhythm. Conveyors and handling devices
integrated the different sections of the labour process and
ensured the movement of materials around the factory floor and
their arrival at the appropriate machine tool or assembly point.
This meant fixing workers to positions determined by the layout
of the machine system.
Starting with the Model T Ford the design of products was
standardised. This standardisation facilitated the use of routine
machine and work processes throughout the plant and meant that
the work process could be planned in great detail beforehand, an
elaboration of the originally Taylorist notion of preplanning.
It also meant that advanced machine tools could be permanently
incorporated into the production process as they would be used
in the same way over and over again.
Advances in machine tool technology effectively transferred skill
from machinists into the technology itself exacerbating the
tendency toward deskilling and job fragmentation. This did not
mean that machine operators and assemblers had no working
knowledge or experience; simply that their skills were no longer
all-round craft skills, nor were they formal or recognised by
management. The *deskilled specialist' as Meyer termed it became
the principal occupation group in fordist plants, because workers
were deskilled in the general sense, yet in possession of job-
specific skills . and competencies for operating specialised
machinery.
This analysis of the fordist labour process is relatively
uncontroversial, although its applicability across industry and
across all advanced economies has been contested. It is the
presentation of fordism as a regime of accumulation (or social
structure of accumulation) that has generated considerable
debate. This understanding of fordism can be summarised as
follows.
Ford introduced the famous x$5 day' which attracted a continuous
pool of job seekers to the gates of the Highland Park plant and
visibly brought home the lesson of easy replaceability of
recalcitrant labour. By boosting wage levels, it also provided
the material means for the development of a * social consumption
norm' (Aglietta, 1979) creating a mass market for the products
of mass production. After the Second World War, the increases in
social wealth generated by the fordist labour process together
with the growth of an industrial labour movement resulted in real
wage improvements, and linked together in a virtuous circle, mass
production with mass consumption.
The growth of industrial unions and the increasing power of the
industrial working class was institutionalised in the spread of
collective bargaining practices within American corporations-
Bowles et al refer to this regulation of class conflict as the
Capital-Labour Accord in which labour traded off material well-
being for managerial control over the organisation of work
(Bowles, Gordon and Weisskopf 1984). Rising real wages were
supplemented by the state's provision of jobs and social security
in a Keynesian equilibrium. The productivity increases generated
by the fordist labour process offset the rises in capital
intensity and real wages so that the rate of profit was
stabilised in the long run.
This model of fordism, which is clearly much broader than the
labour process itself, assumed an international character in the
post war years, underlying America's international domination.
However towards the end of the 1960's the system's stability
began to erode in the wake of a series of political and economic
challenges including America's loss of the Vietnam War, the
student-worker protests in Europe and the prominence of civil-
rights /black power social movements in the United States, the
economic ascendancy of Japan, the abandoning of the Bretton Woods
monetary systems which introduced floating exchange rates, the
oil shocks in the early 1970's and galloping inflation combined
with rising unemployment2. Productivity rates declined and the
social consensus was substantially undermined (Bowles, Gordon and
Weisskopf 1984) .
This crisis saw a shift in state policy towards control of the
money supply as an international debt economy emerged. The
balance of international power shifted in favour of countries
like Japan, and the balance of power between classes changed with
the growing inability of the union movement to maintain workers'
standard of living. It also saw a restructuring of the
organisation of work and the labour market as well as a change
in social consumption patterns in an attempt to regain the high
rates of productivity increases of the fordist era.
According to its exponents, post-fordist work organisation is
centred on the notion of flexibility3. It combines automation
which increases the scope of technological flexibility with new
managerial strategies of labour control which emphasise their
numerical and functional flexibility. The flexible labour process
produces a wide variety of products which are sold in niche
markets.
Piore and Sabel's model of flexible specialisation made a case
for the empowerment of labour implicit in this restructuring.
They proposed a revival of craft forms of production based on
multi-skilled workers, technological sophistication and
competition between small firms subject to constant innovation.
Automation would allow firms to cut the costs of customised
production yet still offer the consumer unbounded choice within
niche markets. They based their argument on the development of
industrial districts of defined communities with extended family
structures, artisanal and merchant traditions and assistance from
local state structures. Such a labour process would reunite
conception and execution and facilitate relations of solidarity
and communalism (Piore and Sabel, 1984).
This idealised notion of post-fordism's potential unleashed a
host of critical responses. A number of authors responded to the
political implications of Piore and Sabel's work arguing that the
working class was in fact further segmented by the restructuring
which undermined their capacity for resistance and subjected them
to greater subordination within production (Murray, 1987).
Other commentators have pointed to the inadequacy of generalising
from a limited number of disparate industrial districts and argue
that Japan's model of structural flexibility has more coherence
and applicability4. Japanese flexibility is premised on a
fundamental division within the labour market between a core and
periphery: the former provides functional flexibility in the form
of multi-skilled workers, easily redeployed, who are represented
by docile enterprise-unions which facilitate a distinct style of
class accommodation. Workers in the periphery provide numerical
flexibility with insecure work contracts and their location in
temporary and casual positions within large companies or in the
small business sector which supplies the large, export-oriented
assembly firms. Core companies are still engaged in mass
production, but the innovation and flexibility provided by
automation and skilled labour, combined with a targeted export-
orientation, allow for product diversification and niche
marketing5.
While many of the critics accept the rupture thesis implicit in
Piore and Sabel's formulation of the restructuring of work,
Pollert explicitly contests this notion. She argues that
flexibility in the labour process and labour market is not new:
any changes that Piore and Sabel identify are a normal part of
the process of capitalist accumulation and competition that
forces capital to continuously restructure work and adapt working
practices. She cites for example the long history of sub-
contracting in British industry and refers to functional
flexibility in the engineering sector as the long-standing
practice of combining production and maintenance work rather than
multi-skilling per se (IDS 1987).
She contests the integrity of fordism as a * technological
paradigm' (Piore and Sabel 1984) arguing that Piore and Sabel set
up a false dichotomy between mass and craft production. Instead
her approach recognises that mass production is more flexible
than the post-fordist literature allows. Pollert notes the co-
existence of small batch, large batch and process production and
attribute no primary importance to large batch or mass
production. Furthermore she contests the break-up of mass
markets, arguing instead that the capture of niche markets is a
deliberate strategy to fine-tune consumer tastes as a result of
intensified competition. It is evidence of capital's
sophisticated manipulation of mass markets rather than evidence
of its decline. Furthermore the core/periphery divide,
distinctive of the post-fordist literature, ignores the long-
standing nature of labour market segmentation.
Sayer's intervention in the debate also shows that mass
production is not simply associated with Fordism. He shows how
mass production is flourishing in Japan and in turn undermining
the western (fordist) forms of mass production through
competition. He contends that capitalist industry has always
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combined flexibilities and inflexibilities and what appears to
be new are the particular permutations rather than a
straightforward trend towards flexibility.
While the fordist/post-fordist model, as an ideal type, has
considerable explanatory value, it tends to over-simplify the
changes in the work organisation and labour markets, as well as
consumption patterns. If it is to be used effectively it should
not be presented as comprising mutually exclusive labour
processes but as a continuum which allows a more historically
specific and accurate understanding of the labour process to
emerge.
<ii) Racial Fordism (South Africa)
Gelb has effectively used Regulation theory to make sense of the
post-war South African economy and explain the nature of its
present crisis (Gelb 1991). He adapts the concept of ^peripheral
fordism' developed by Lipietz (1987) to explain Third World
development in its global context. Gelb presents ^racial fordism'
as the peculiar combination of the technology/labour process of
Ford but without mass consumption norms. Instead consumer goods
were consumed primarily by a small but wealthy white community.
This led to an industrialisation strategy of import-substitution
in the consumer durables sector. The state adopted a policy of
protecting nascent manufacturing against foreign competition. In
addition, South Africa as a mineral exporter was able to import
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capital equipment for manufacturing based on a fixed
international price of gold which provided stable export
earnings.
The white working class, through a preferential labour market
policy, moved into skilled and supervisory positions in the
mining and manufacturing industries, with steady rises in real
wages. This allowed them to participate in the consumption of
housing and consumer goods. Gelb documents how the institutions
of collective bargaining, racially-skewed social welfare systems
and favourable credit arrangements underpinned this pattern (Gelb
1991).
The African working class occupied a subordinate position within
the labour market as their mobility was restricted by job
reservation and they had little collective bargaining power up
until the 1970s. Control over black workers was strictly enforced
through the migrant labour system, the pass laws and hostels.
Their consumption patterns were based almost exclusively on
subsistence requirements. Industrialisation eventually produced
a stratum of semi-skilled urbanised African workers as
manufacturing companies sought the abolition of job reservation
allowing them to employ cheaper African labour. The real incomes
of blacks did grow in the post-war period, albeit very slowly
(Gelb 1991). However their bargaining position remained weak
given high levels of unemployment.
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The post war period represented the golden age for white South
Africa, particularly during the 1960s when African resistance had
been forced into exile and underground, black workers remained
unorganised, the gold price was stable and manufacturing
displayed unprecedented high growth rates.
Following the Regulation approach Gelb documents how racial
fordism began to reach its limits in the early 197 0s and
productivity growth began to level off. The economy was
characterised by skill shortages, a meagre export market, a
*free' gold price and high levels of imports which imposed a
ceiling on further growth as capital was not available to finance
investment. Gelb argues that the mass production system imposed
a constraint of inflexibility. The concentration of large numbers
of workers in manufacturing companies had produced conducive
conditions for the rise of industrial unions. This in turn
generated rising real wages for black workers as the unions grew
in numbers and strength during the 1970s. Unit labour costs were
pushed up while productivity slowed. The oil shocks negatively
affected the South African economy, as did capital flight after
political upheavals, such as the 1976 uprising. By the late 1970s
the economy was in recession and suffered from high levels of
inflation and stagnation (Gelb 1991).
While this explanation of South Africa's economic crisis has been
particularly useful in facilitating the development of new
economic policies6 it has not shed any light on the changing
nature of the labour process itself. It assumes the ubiquitous
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adoption of fordist manufacturing techniques and argues simply
that inflexibility prompted restructuring of work in the late
1970s and 1980s. Following Amsden's critique of the use of the
concept of peripheral fordism to describe industrialisation in
Korea, *to recognise and label the emergence of more complex
production in the Third World as "peripheral Fordism" is not to
explain it' (Amsden 1990: 9).
The next section will argue that not only was consumption skewed
by racial fordism, but the limited nature of the market has in
fact shaped the way in which work itself is organised. South
African manufacturing has never been characterised by the fordist
model because mass production has been impossible. Hence, the
notion of *racial fordism' is not based on a fordist labour
process, and is essentially an imported construct which is unable
to shed light on the way in which industrial work is structured
and restructered in South Africa. Ironically, it is only with the
current opening up of export markets and potential changes in the
nature of domestic consumption, that fordism itself becomes
feasible, as long as the problems of low productivity and lack
of international competitiveness are resolved.
(iii) Work Organisation in the Metal Industry
It will be argued from the evidence presented below that some
sort of restructuring of work is currently underway in the South
African metal industry, although many of the specific management
strategies have their origins in previous times. It is clear
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that the influence of Japanese management strategies is
pervasive, however, their implementation is both limited and
piecemeal.
A survey was conducted, in 1990-1991, of firms affiliated to
Steel and Engineering Industries Federation of South Africa
(SEIFSA) and to the National Association of Automotive Component
and Allied Manufacturers (NAACAM) which included companies from
the iron and steel, fabricated products, machinery, electrical
and automotive sectors7. This industry was selected for
investigation due to its strategic location in the manufacturing
industry in terms of its production of capital and consumer
goods, its employment significance, its relatively high rate of
unionisation, its potential for growth and preliminary
indications of its restructuring.
In particular, two aspects of work organisation were addressed,
the nature of technology and strategies related to the management
of labour. The aim was to investigate the types and extent of
automation and participative management. The f ordist/post-f ordist
literature suggests that there is a relationship between the type
of technology employed in production and the social organisation
of work: as technology changes from the mechanisation associated
with fordism to highly automated flexible technology, related
changes in the management of labour could be expected. The notion
of labour as a resource rather than a cost (Kaplinsky 1990)
suggests that greater worker participation in the management of
production would be facilitated.
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The results of the survey show that 61 percent of companies have
introduced some form of automation although these remain mainly
-islands of automation with very little integration between
automated functions. It is in the integration that the key to
flexible manufacturing lies as it allows design, manufacture,
conveyance and testing to be linked together. In the absence of
integration, automatic equipment tends to be utilised in a
dedicated fashion, simply replacing monotonous human
intervention.
One company surveyed contracted out its numerically controlled
(NC) machining to companies that have spare capacity because the
'reduced market does not allow us to invest in such machinery'.
Another manufacturer involved in jobbing claimed that * because
each product is custom-made, it is very diverse. Therefore there
is no potential for automation in production or design'. A metal
pressing company had a completely dedicated spot-welding robot
beside a number of manual welding booths. Flexibility in
scheduling and product change came from the manual welders rather
than the robot. Local managers claim that the market is simply
too limited to promote extensive automation or to allow
integration. ^1 need to be flexible; that's why I can't
automate', was the comment of one production manager summing up
this approach.
The nature of the islands of automation were investigated further
and a particular pattern began to emerge. Seventy six percent of
companies have automated their design process by introducing
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computer-aided design (CAD). Forty three percent have automated
some aspect of manufacture and 19 percent use automatic test
equipment. Very few companies have introduced automation for
materials handling, packing and storage. These latter three
functions have not been extensively automated mainly because they
are all low skilled occupations and have traditionally been
carried out by cheap manual labour. Design and testing on the
other hand, require relatively high degrees of skill which are
in short supply in South Africa. It is these functions that have
been prioritised in the companies' automation initiatives. One
technical manager commented that automation was necessary to
xproduce high quality goods with much more accuracy'. Another
linked quality requirements and automation because * labour cannot
be made more sophisticated'. Hence automation is prioritised in
highly competitive and export-oriented markets in order to
replaced under-skilled labour.
Quality emerged as a key issue for manufacturers. Many companies
interviewed were involved in acquiring quality ratings either
from the South African Bureau of Standards or other recognised
international bodies (such as the Q101 rating). This was
particularly true of companies looking to export markets to
supplement their orders.
The automotive sector (including motor components) has a higher
proportion of companies than the sample average with some form
of automation (72 percent) while iron and steel is still
predominantly semi-automatic (related to the technology of
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fordism). Further-more, in the electrical and fabricated products
sectors companies with semi-automatic technology are numerically
equivalent to those who have introduced some automation. Even
those companies which have introduced CAD or automatic testing
devices, remain on the whole semi-automatic because of the
absence of any integration between islands of automation.
When taking the size of companies into account, a clear trend
emerges. In the smallest companies low levels of automation
predominate: 58 percent of small companies8 have not introduced
any form of automation. Medium sized companies follow the
industry trend9, while large companies10 have no manual work
processes and much higher levels of automation than the industry
average: 82 percent of companies with between 200 and 300
employees have some form of automation. In addition, it is worth
noting that in very large companies of over 300 employees,
integrated automation is more common than islands of automation,
suggesting a far more developed programme of automation.
The introduction of workplace participation in the metal industry
was similarly piecemeal and varied. Managerial responses to the
survey identified a host of communication and suggestion schemes
which incorporated workers into a system of information sharing
but did not extend their participation in decision-making. Many
of these schemes were designed to actively solicit workers' ideas
about improving throughput, quality and productivity. They were
introduced on the assumption that workers can productively
contribute to problem-solving and innovation on the shopfloor,
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under the influence of Japanese management. One production
manager related how their quality management had changed: xthree
years ago we made as many products as possible and then sorted
out the good ones from the bad ones. Now the operator is made
responsible for quality. They mark their clock numbers on their
parts and they can be traced back if there is a defect. This
approach we call quality first and production second'.
Since the late 1970s, unionised workers won for themselves the
right to participate in decision-making via collective
bargaining. This process has historically related to decisions
about wage levels and conditions of employment and not about
corporate policy on work organisation, investment patterns or new
product or marketing strategies. In addition, this process has
been characterised by adverserialism backed up by increasing
rates of strike action reaching a peak in 1987, and not by
codetermination.
The results of the metal industry survey show that worker
participation through collective bargaining is widespread and
facilitates unionised workers' influence over conditions of
service: more than half of the companies recognise unions while
30 percent have formalised regular meetings with shop stewards
who voice grievances and present the views and interests of their
members* One human resource manager described the content of such
meetings with shop stewards: *we discuss general things like the
need to be competitive. We discuss benefits, retrenchments and
grievances. Stewards are also given the opportunity to raise
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workers' problems'. This description seems to typify the
management approach which in general restricts its disclosure of
information and allows stewards to table their queries and
demands related to shopfloor working conditions. Wage bargaining
mainly takes place at industry level although 35 percent of
respondent companies supplement industrial negotiations with
company or plant level bargaining.
The automotive sector shows the relative strength of the union.
Union representation through collective bargaining, consultation
and joint committees takes place in over 50 percent of companies.
Table 1 demonstrates the relative penetration of union
"organisation in the motor sector and explains the very high level
of participation through collective bargaining.
Table 1: Unionisation rates by sector
Sector
Iron and Steel
Fabricated Goods
Machinery
Electrical Goods
Automotive
% Unionised
69%
75%
64%
64%
81%
% Numsa
41%
57%
43%
50%
68%
This is the type of industrial relations most closely related to
the fordist model which excludes the union from policy related
decision-making. In South Africa, a union culture of boycott has
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developed which labels participation in management as co-optive
and pursues a strategy of defending workers interests. Management
now perceives this culture as problematic: xfor this company shop
stewards are really unnecessary for the benefit of the company.
They never make any positive contribution and they are always
anti (sic)'.
To overcome this, a number of innovations have taken place.
Firstly, a significant number of companies are attempting to
change the nature of their labour force to avoid what they see
as ^militant' unionism. One manager claimed that he had not hired
any black workers since his workforce was unionised: *the whites
may be unionised but the white unions are not militant'. Another
has regularly hired white students who are largely unskilled as
they constitute an ununionised, temporary labour force which
provides numerical flexibility. A further company employs a
stable temporary workforce to run an electrical furnace for nine
months of each year. During the other three months the furnace
is closed to cut electrical costs. Subcontracting also frequently
allows companies to hire very small permanent workforces. These
innovations provide employers with greater numerical flexibility
in a way that often undermines union organisation.
The second important innovation is the widespread introduction
of shopfloor communication structures which included quality
circles, green areas and other formal and regular channels for
workers to contribute their ideas and problem-solving skills in
30 percent of the companies surveyed. These structures have clear
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parameters and involve consulting workers on production
schedules, work allocation and product runs as well as eliciting
their suggestions as to productivity and quality improvements.
They represent a direct form of participation, unmediated by
union representation. In the vast majority of cases these
shopfloor structures of participation have not been negotiated
with the union.
In a further 17 percent of companies less formal channels of
communication have been introduced and are intended to encourage
workers to contribute to productivity and quality improvement.
This means that 47 percent of companies have adopted this new
approach to the management of labour. It does not provide much
opportunity for workers to influence decisions, but recognises
that shopfloor workers have a wealth of experience and tacit
skill which needs to be harnessed to ensure more productive and
innovative working practices. One company's motivation in
introducing green areas was to achieve *a team culture, improve
communications and introduce a disciplinary factor as each member
of the team makes sure that all are pulling their weight. Workers
who let the team down have to face peer pressure rather than the
supervisor's discipline'. This quote illustrates the very limited
nature of participation provided by these shopfloor structures,
as well as their implicit coercion.
Very few companies in the sample had developed co-operative forms
of decision-making which involved union representation. Less than
10 percent established joint committees of union and management
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representatives involving consultation about corporate decisions
or actively including unionists in the process of decision-making
about appointments, production organisation, job grading or
technology upgrading.
Finally 20 percent of companies have neither union-based
representation nor any opportunities for workers to communicate
with management or influence their decisions. The complete
absence of participation is clearly related to company size as
NUMSA has been unable to penetrate the small companies
effectively and only 10 percent of small companies have shop
.stewards. However, these small companies do have a relatively
high incidence of shopfloor communication structures (over 70
percent).
The relationship between automation and participation was
investigated and it was found that companies with islands of
automation and some integration do not commonly have shopfloor
communication structures. This contradicts typically post-fordist
predictions. It is rather in the companies that have retained the
essentially semi-automated production processes that quality
circle-type structures are found. It may be concluded from this
that companies which face restricted access to advanced
technology are focusing on labour as a source of productivity
improvement. One company based its programme of improving
productivity purely on a changed relationship with labour
involving more open communication and better training: 'why
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invest money in capital equipment if it costs no money to get
people to work smarter?'
The SEIFSA/NAACAM survey also investigated the nature of work
organisation in the industry. It found that management's control
strategies are organically linked to the nature of the labour
process, which varies considerably from sector to sector. The
iron and steel and machinery sectors, for example, have a higher
than average incidence of shopfloor communication structures (48
percent each): in these sectors the layout of the production
process involves the grouping of similar operation together.
Hence work teams are relatively common thereby facilitating group
working arrangements.
Table 2: Group-based layout by sector.
Sector Percentage Companies
Iron and Steel 34%
fabricated Goods 26%
Machinery 41%
Electrical Goods 27%
Automotive 28%
The most common type of shopfloor layout amongst the sample
companies is that of the ^flexible assembly line'. Run sizes are
simply not large enough in the South African market to have
dedicated assembly lines. One manager explained the implications
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of this: 'we make 180 different parts. We inherited equipment
from Germany where they make long runs of parts. We have to
change over the machinery frequently and this is time-consuming.
It takes on average one and a half days. It's no wonder that
Germany is so much more productive than we are'.
Although there is commonly a logical progression in the movement
of work-in-progress around the shopfloor, there are often
deviations to accommodate customised orders. The ad-hoc nature
of work organisation is captured in one production manager's
description of how he creates a specialised job card for each
order and a work route suitable to the job. He said *you get a
feel for how things should be done, from experience'.
Supply networks have undergone significant changes in recent
years. These networks have been instrumental in the restructuring
of work organisation in the motor components sector in
particular. Aspects of the Japanese just-in-time (JIT) system of
production have been widely adopted in this sector and are
beginning to spread to other sectors. In particular the
production of goods to order and not for stockpiling is common,
particularly in the light of a stagnating economy in which
companies cannot afford to tie up their capital in stock. One
manager commented: *I can't buy things now and then only get paid
for the work I do in six months time. JIT is the only way to do
it' .
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The implementation of such a supply system places pressure on the
work process to ensure that orders are met in the required time
once they have been placed. It has particularly affected the
automotive component manufacturers as the large motor assemblers,
two with licensing agreements with Japanese companies, have been
at the forefront of this innovation. This explains the relatively
high incidence of shopfloor communication structures in this
sector.
Table 3: Companies that manufacture to order, by sector.
Sector Made to Order Partially to Order Not to Order
Iron and Steel 48% 24% 21%
Fabricated Goods 44% 36% 16%
Machinery 30% 41% 25%
Electrical Goods 27% 41% 13%
Automotive 52% 29% 13%
The relatively high incidence of companies that manufacture
*partially to order' indicates the problems that arise when
implementing management systems from elsewhere. Many companies
cannot afford to follow this path rigidly primarily because of
the essentially *fordist' industrial relations system prevalent
in South Africa. If deliveries cannot be guaranteed xjust-in-
time' then suppliers will lose their contracts and hence they
build up stock in the context of a volatile industrial relations
environment in which strikes and stayaways are frequent and
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unpredictable. Another common restriction on JIT implementation
is the sourcing of many parts from overseas, particularly in the
motor assembly sector. This places pressure on local suppliers:
* Nissan waits for CKD stores from Japan and, as soon as they
arrive, expects our parts to be delivered immediately. We are the
ones squeezed by their JIT system - we have to carry the stock'.
These results provide ample evidence to support the argument that
the labour process should be conceptualised as a continuum,
rather than in terms of the polar opposites of fordism and post-
fordism. The small runs, customised production and non-continuous
plant layout contradict the fundamentally fordist features of
mass production. In addition, there is considerable evidence of
long-standing labour market segmentation and employment of
temporary and casual labour.
On the other hand some characteristics of the fordist model are
present: the widespread use of semi-automatic technology;
collective bargaining and adverserial unionism; stock piling of
products and the lack of skills training, maintaining the
traditional ^deskilled specialist'.
Evidence has been presented of a restructuring of work based on
Japanese management. However there is no coherent post-fordist
model emerging. Islands of automation are not providing
manufacturers with production flexibility because of the short
runs involved. There is no evidence of multi-skilling and in fact
many managers see automation filling the skills gap. Just-in-time
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strategies have been partially introduced because of the
economy's continued reliance on imports and because of the
essentially fordist industrial relations system.
Some of the features of so-called post-fordism are however
evident. The widespread implementation of shopfloor communication
structures is significant, particularly where they are posed in
direct opposition to representative union structures. Associated
with these new structures is the increasing emphasis on quality
which requires companies to meet international standards and also
requires shopfloor workers to *build quality in', rather than
* inspect it in' after production.
(iv) Conclusion
The empirical evidence from the South African metal industry
exposes the incoherence of a rigid model of fordism and post-
fordism in South African manufacturing. As Pollert and Sayer have
argued, flexibilities have always been combined with
inflexibilities. But ignoring the complexity of the labour
process itself has a particular significance for the concept of
'racial fordism'. It suggests an inadequate grasp of the relation
between the labour process and the other social institutions and
structures associated with the fordist regime of accumulation.
More importantly, the racially skewed nature of consumption has
exerted a major effect on the nature of the labour process by
preventing the emergence of mass production in many significant
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sectors of manufacturing. This has in turn affected the nature
of work restructuring and prevented the introduction of
integrated automation. Hence the flexibility associated with
*post-fordist technology' is absent. The result is a piecemeal
adaptation of Japanese management strategies which combines
quality circles and modified just-in-time supply relations with
long-standing practices of employing temporary and casual labour.
The evidence suggests that these flexible innovations have more
to do with manufacturers' attempts to adjust to a stagnating
economy, than slavishly following the model of post-fordism.
The implications for the notion of * racial fordism' are self-
evident: it is precisely the non-fordist nature of the labour
process that emerges as a primary factor in explaining its
ongoing decline in productivity. Solutions to economic stagnation
and lack of competitiveness should take account of the absence
of mass production (and consumption) associated with the benefits
of economies of scale, high rates of capital investment and
technological integration as well as draw selectively on some of
the positive innovations associated with post-fordism such as the
recognition of the formal and tacit skills of labour. It points
to a need for a detailed investigation of the labour process and
the restructuring of work in formulating South Africa's future
economic policies.
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NOTES
1. This paper focuses on fordism as a labour process and simply
refers to the fordist regime of accumulation. See Lipeitz,
Aglietta, De Vroey, Boyer.
2. This is by no means an exhaustive description of the crisis.
3. See for example Piore and Sabel, Kaplinsky and Murray.
4. See for example Kenney and Florida, Sayer
5. See for example Sayer, 1989 and Chalmers, 1989.
6. The Economic Trends project from which this analysis is drawn
provided Cosatu with the foundation of its economic project
7. The SEIFSA/NAACAM was designed to investigate the nature of
the restructuring of work in the metal industry. This industry
is strategically located in the manufacturing industry due to its
production of capital and consumer goods, its employment
significance, its relatively high rate of unionisation, its
potential for growth and preliminary indications of its
restructuring. A random sample of 700 SEIFSA companies was drawn
(out of a total of 3419), stratified for region and sector. In
addition, a 100% sample of 300 companies affiliated to NAACAM was
included, as well as some members of the Motor Industries
Federation, and all seven motor manufacturers. A 40% response
rate was obtained. The careful design of the sample and the
relatively high response rate, indicate that the results of this
survey may safely be generalised for the industry as a whole. To
supplement the survey, 15 companies in the PWV were visited:
detailed factory tours and in-depth interviews with production
management took place.
8. Small companies are defined as those with less than 51
employees.
9. Medium-sized companies are those employing between 51 and 150
employees.
10. Large companies employ 150 or more employees.
30
REFERENCES
Aglietta Michel (1979) - A Theory of Capitalist Regulation
(London: New Left Books)
Amsden, Alice (1990) - *Third world industrialization: "Global
Fordism" or a new model?' in New Left
Review. vl82 (July/August).
Bowles, S, D.M. Gordon and T.E. Weisskopf (1983) - Beyond the
Wasteland. A Democratic Alternative to
Economic Decline (New York: Doubleday).
Braverman Harry (1974) - Labor and Monopoly Capital (New York:
Monthly Review Press)
Chalmers Norma (1989) - Industrial Relations in Japan. The
Peripheral Workforce (London:
Routledge).
De Vroey, M (1984) - *A Regulation Approach Interpretation
of the Contemporary Crisis' in Capital
and Class. v2 3.
Edwards, Richard (1979) - Contested Terrain. The
31
Transformation of the Workplace in the
Twentieth Century (New York: Basic
Books).
Gelb, Stephen (1991) - South Africa's Economic Crisis (Cape
Town: David Philip).
Hirst, Paul and Jonathan Zeitlin (1991) - * Flexible
specialization versus post-Fordism:
theory, evidence and policy
implications' in Economy and Society
v20, no 1 (February).
IDS (1986) - ^Flexibility at Work' IDS Study 360
(London: Income Data Services).
Kaplinsky, Raphael (1989) - *Is and what is post-fordism?'
Kenney, M and R, Florida (1987) - ^Beyond mass production:
Production and the labour process in
Japan' (Cornell University: Workshop of
Macroeconomic Planning).
Lipietz, A (1987) - Mirages and Miracles: The Crises of
Global Fordism (London: Verso).
32
Meyer, Stephen (1981) - The Five Dollar Day. Labor. Management
and Social Control in the Ford Motor
Company 1908 - 1921 (Albany State
University of New York).
Murray, Fergus (1987) - ^Flexible Specialisation in the "Third
Italy" ' in Capital and Class, v33
(Winter).
Piore, Michael and Charles Sabel (1984) - The Second
Industrial Divide. Possibilities for
Prosperity (New York: Basic Books)
Pollert, Anna (1985) - ^Dismantling flexibility' in Capital
and Class, v34.
Sayer, Andrew (1989) - 'Postfordism in question' in
International Journal of Urban and
Regional Research (December).
33
